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“If the question of the relation of nature and history 
is to be seriously posed, then it only offers any 
chance of solution if it is possible to comprehend 
historical being in its most extreme historical 
determinacy, where it is most historical, as natural 
being, or if it were possible to comprehend nature 
as an historical being where it seems to rest most 
deeply in itself as nature.” 
 
- Theodor W. Adorno, ‘The Idea of Natural History’ 
(1932) 
 
Evoking the work of the French psychologist Alfred Binet on school children, Anson 
Rabinbach, in The Human Motor (1990), his masterful history of the energy-labour nexus, 
notes that “the critical distinction between fatigue and exhaustion was between the normal 
and the pathological, between the adequate ‘speed of reparation,’ which rest provided, and 
the lack of reparation in exhaustion.” Exhaustion sets in when the “legitimate boundaries of 
fatigue” were transgressed. Or, in the cognate definition in Albert Deschamps’s 1908 Les 
Maladies de l’énergie, exhaustion is “an accumulation of fatigues which were only 
incompletely restored.”2 It is thus possible to propose a preliminary distinction between 
fatigue and exhaustion by locating fatigue on the side of production and exhaustion on that of 
reproduction. Exhaustion occurs, therefore, when a limit or threshold has been crossed such 
that the reproduction of a certain bodily or relational state is no longer possible.  
Though I will not abandon the horizon of individual or subjective exhaustion entirely, 
in what follows I am concerned with thinking this “energetic” impasse of reproducibility in a 
more systemic vein, approaching the theme of exhaustion as a prism through which to 
connect contemporary debates on the consequences of climate change to theorizations of the 
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multiple crises of social reproduction. I will approach exhaustion as a kind of limit-concept 
that allows the exploration of the zones of indiscernibility between the philosophy of history 
and the philosophy of nature, an indiscernibility whose proper name might be materialism. 
The theoretical context for this inquiry is twofold. First, I want to address some pioneering 
recent work that endeavors to produce a historical materialist critique of the ambient 
discourse on the “Anthropocene,” in particular the work of Andreas Malm (Fossil Capital 
2016) and Jason W. Moore (Capitalism in the Web of Life 2015). By homing in on the 
leitmotiv of exhaustion — and particularly Moore’s distinction between its relative and 
absolute modalities — I want to explore how what Malm calls “theory in a warming world”3 
strives to articulate the question of the relationship between the limits to capital and the limits 
to nature. Second, as will hopefully become clear in my concluding considerations on Jean-
Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), I want to place the question of 
exhaustion, and more specifically of the agency “behind” exhaustion, in the framework of an 
on-going project to rethink tragedy as a political form.4 In particular, Sartre’s concept of 
“matter as inverted praxis,” exemplified by his dialectical vignette on peasant labour and 
deforestation in China, will allow me to sketch the idea of a tragedy of materiality, which I 
hope can cut across the agential and ontological debates raised by the geological baptism of 
the Anthropocene, not least the debate about who this Anthropos might be, and to what extent 
its actions require either a dualist or a holist take on the relationship between human Society 
and Nature (my tentative answer will be: neither).  
It is my contention that the problem of “natural history” is at the heart of any 
reconstruction of a truly dialectical critical theory capable of testing its cognitive powers 
against a catastrophic present. The nature, which is also to say the necessity, in history has 
long been the locus of tragedy, but the figure of tragic agency needs to be thoroughly revised 
in light of what recent theoretical concern with anthropogenic climate change foregrounds 
but fails to illuminate – the immanence of social praxis to material nature. By way of a 
historical corrective to the self-congratulatory notes sounded by talk of the Anthropocene – 
whose claims for novelty are often hard to detach from the conceptual boosterism that infects 
the critique of capitalism with the spirit of its target – I begin with a short and admittedly 
impressionistic history of exhaustion. Nineteenth-century concerns with the irrevocable 
depletion of nature, rich in material lessons, were also accompanied by speculative, cosmo-
political efforts, wherein humanity was thought in terms both of its ends and its end. 
Attention to the contrasts and overlaps between exhaustion, degradation, and entropy as 
natural-historical ideologies, may perhaps serve as an antidote to the rush to establish the 
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Anthropocene as the keyword of our present. It can also provide us with a more nuanced 
sense of the context of emergence of the historical materialist theory of the relations between 
political economy and nature – namely in Marx’s wrestling with debates on soil exhaustion –  
especially when that theory, creatively revised, is providing the richest counter to what may 
be the ultimate twist in the ideological work of naturalization: naturalizing humanity’s 
transformation of nature. The paper then moves to a consideration of Moore’s contribution to 
the thinking of the exhaustion of historical natures, foregrounding the interaction of logics of 
appropriation and exploitation, and thence to an exploration of how the very structure of the 
exploitation of labour-power gives capitalist exhaustion its shape as the accelerating wastage 
of material natures. Notwithstanding the wealth of theoretical articulation and insight 
produced by the debates under review, I contend that they reach an impasse of sorts when 
they are translated into the metaphysical discourse of dualism or monism. Whence the 
perhaps unfashionable, concluding suggestion that we turn to Sartre’s dialectical excavation 
of the tragic structure that haunts relations between praxis and matter as a possible model for 
incorporating a theory of action into our arguments about exhaustion. 
 
Exhaustion, Degradation, Entropology 
The expression “universal” or “general exhaustion” (die allgemeine Erschöpfung in German) 
is taken from a famously “prophetic”5 text of Friedrich Engels from 1887 which anticipated, 
with grim lucidity, the unraveling of World War One three decades thence:  
Eight to ten millions of soldiers will massacre one another and in doing so devour the 
whole of Europe until they have stripped it barer than any swarm of locusts has ever 
done. The devastations of the Thirty Years’ War compressed into three or four years, 
and spread over the whole Continent; famine, pestilence, general demoralisation both 
of the armies and of the mass of the people produced by acute distress … absolute 
impossibility of foreseeing how it will all end and who will come out of the struggle 
as victor; only one result is absolutely certain: general exhaustion and the 
establishment of the conditions for the ultimate victory of the working class.6 
Prospected from within the ambit of Marxism’s overall political epistemology of crisis, this 
exhaustion is figured as a prelude to proletarian victory, in which the horrific autophagic 
agony of bourgeois civilization shades into the birth-pangs of socialist society. Spent, no 
longer able to reproduce itself, capitalism is exhausted in the sense of irreparable. 
Exhaustion is a revolutionary precursor. It is striking how much this model repeats another 
text on war and humanity’s emancipation, from a hundred years before, namely Immanuel 
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Kant’s 1784 “Idea of Universal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan,” which I quote here in 
Thomas De Quincey’s translation:  
Nature accordingly avails herself of the spirit of enmity in Man, as existing even in 
the great national corporations of that animal, for the purpose of attaining through the 
inevitable antagonism of this spirit a state of rest and security: i.e. by wars, by the 
immoderate exhaustion of incessant preparations for war, and by the pressure of evil 
consequences … she drives nations to all sorts of experiments and expedients; and 
finally, after infinite devastations, ruin, and universal exhaustion of energy, to one 
which reason should have suggested without the cost of so sad an experience, — viz. 
to quit the barbarous condition of lawless power, and to enter into a federal league of 
nations.7 
Collective will is born from an antagonism (unsociable sociability, class struggle, world war, 
and civil war) that requires the exhaustion of the energies fixed in the prior dispensation of 
powers, the crossing of a threshold of reproducibility. It is a concept in a philosophy of 
history (and in Kant’s case of nature and natural purpose) — as signaled by its 
“inevitability.” For Kant, nature’s cosmopolitical plan is “the inevitable resource and mode of 
escape under that pressure of evil which nations reciprocally inflict.” For Engels addressing 
the masters of war, this entails that “at the end of the tragedy [they] will be ruined and the 
victory of the proletariat will either have already been achieved or else inevitable.”8 
Yet Engels was also the thinker of another inevitability, another exhaustion: the 
exhaustion of (human) history in and by nature. Responding to widespread, contentious 
debates on the laws of thermodynamics and the thesis of a heat-death of the universe (a 
theme revived in more recent times by Jean-François Lyotard in The Inhuman and Ray 
Brassier in Nihil Unbound), Engels, while strenuously rejecting the idea of a universal heat-
death — which he regarded as saturated with crypto-theological eschatologies of exhaustion 
— contemplated the… inevitable demise of humanity. 9 He did so in a lyrical passage that the 
Italian Marxist philologist and philosopher Sebastiano Timpanaro, advancing a pessimist and 
naturalist materialism equal parts Marx and Giacomo Leopardi, praised for showing that 
socialism need not require delusions of species immortality.10 In the Introduction to his 
Dialectics of Nature, Engels writes:  
Millions of years may elapse, hundreds of thousands of generations be born and die, 
but inexorably the time will come when the declining warmth of the sun will no 
longer suffice to melt the ice thrusting itself forward from the poles; when the human 
race, crowding more and more about the equator, will finally no longer find even 
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there enough heat for life; when gradually even the last trace of organic life will 
vanish; and the earth, an extinct frozen globe like the moon, will circle in deepest 
darkness and in an ever narrower orbit about the equally extinct sun, and at last fall 
into it.11 
Engels also acknowledged his precursors, writing in Anti-Dühring: “As Kant introduced into 
natural science the ultimate destruction of the earth, so Fourier introduced into historical 
thought the ultimate extinction of humanity.”12 It is to Charles Fourier that the historians of 
science Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, in their The Shock of the 
Anthropocene, have recently turned to show how — contrary to the weird self-congratulatory 
tendencies of contemporary commentators — nineteenth-century thought did not just 
entertain apocalyptic visions particular to the its industrial, imperial and financialized 
regimes of accumulation, but was strikingly cognizant of anthropogenic climate and 
environmental change.13 Ironically, from our present vantage, Fourier’s concern was the 
cooling of the climate, a “malady of the earth” that he regarded as a product of social 
immobility and stagnation, of the delay of a transition to socialism. The material suffering of 
the planet was of a piece with human suffering, and, as he observed in his unpublished 1822 
manuscript De la détérioration matérielle de la planète, “the prolongation of the social limbo 
causes a rapid progress in climactic vices,” leading to forms of material and social exhaustion 
that bourgeois society is congenitally incapable of preventing.14  
The preoccupation with social and material exhaustion, anthropogenic and otherwise, 
traverses the Victorian era, surfacing, for instance, in the anarchist geographer Piotr 
Kropotkin’s work on the climactic sources of Eurasian desiccation (recently recovered by 
Mike Davis),15 in Gabriel Tarde’s science-fiction of “solar anaemia”,16 in Antoine Augustin 
Cournot’s warning to Léon Walras that the laissez-faire “curves of intensive and extensive 
utility” would lead to devastating deforestation and racial domination, or in Ruskin’s 
delirious speculations on “The Storm-Cloud of the Nineteenth Century,” wherein wind 
“figures the degradation of all existing structures.”17 “Ruskin,” Thomas Richards tell us, 
“closes his lecture by meditating on that sunless entropic end: ‘the Empire of England, on 
which formerly the sun never set, has become one on which he never rises.’ Here the heat-
death of the universe has become the heat-death of the Empire.”18 This recalls George 
Caffentzis’s observation about capitalist apocalypticism: “Whenever the ongoing model of 
exploitation becomes untenable, capital has intimations of mortality qua the world’s end”.19 
A striking index of the resilience of these overlapping nineteenth-century discourses 
of exhaustion and degradation can be found in the work of Claude Lévi-Strauss. As Patrick 
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Wilcken recounts in his recent biography, Lévi-Strauss, having been invited by UNESCO in 
1971 to reprise the critique of racial thought articulated in the 1952 Race and History, caused 
notable embarrassment to his hosts by evoking the warnings about cultural and racial 
dedifferentiation infamously voiced by Count Gobineau in that seminal tract of racist theory, 
An Essay on the Inequality of Human Races.20 What is symptomatic in Lévi-Strauss 
anthropological plea for the defense of cultural diversity is the extent to which it bears 
witness to the lamination in his thought of two nineteenth-century discourses of exhaustion, 
that of (cultural, racial and biological) degradation — deployed both to bolster the efforts of 
criminological science21 and to justify the genocidal tendencies of settler colonialism22 — 
and the thermodynamic discourses of entropy. In the concluding pages of his melancholy 
masterpiece Tristes Tropiques, Lévi-Strauss, echoing the figure of species annihilation 
already rehearsed by Engels in the Dialectics of Nature, to reflect upon the task of the 
anthropologist, doubling the exhaustion of the very cultures he studies with the exhaustion of 
the human race as such. The latter, far from a conserver of cultural and historical diversity, is 
depicted in all its tragic-ironic ambivalence: protection turns into destruction, the fixing of 
difference accelerates dedifferentiation.23 Lévi-Strauss anticipates the invocation of inertia of 
his great opponent, Sartre, while trying to transcode entropy into a discourse about culture: 
[Man’s] role is itself a machine, brought perhaps to a greater point of perfection than 
any other, whose activity hastens the disintegration of an initial order and precipitates 
a powerfully organized Matter towards a condition of inertia which grows ever 
greater and will one day prove definitive. From the day when he first learned how to 
breathe and how to keep himself alive, through the discovery of fire and right up to 
the invention of the atomic and thermonuclear devices of the present day, Man has 
never save only when he reproduces himself done other than cheerfully dismantle 
million upon million of structures and reduce their elements to a state in which they 
can no longer be reintegrated. No doubt he has built cities and brought the soil to 
fruition; but if we examine these activities closely we shall find that they also are 
inertia-producing machines, whose scale and speed of action are infinitely greater 
than the amount of organization implied in them. ... Taken as a whole, therefore, 
civilization can be described as a prodigiously complicated mechanism: tempting as it 
would be to regard it as our universe s best hope of survival, its true function is to 
produce what physicists call entropy: inertia, that is to say. 
Whence Lévi-Strauss’s punning proposal to rechristen anthropology as entropology, the 
“discipline that devotes itself to the study of this process of disintegration in its most highly 
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evolved forms.”24 The cosmic-cultural pessimism of the final pages of Tristes Tropiques, 
leavened or even redeemed by an aestheticized figure of “grace,”25 is modulated somewhat in 
Lévi-Strauss’s later speculations on how “just” societies could be considered in terms of 
entropy-transfers, from society to culture; riffing on a Saint-Simonian dictum, he proposes 
that: 
A society is at once a machine and the work done by that machine. As a steam engine, 
it produces entropy, but if we look upon it as a mechanism, it produces order. This 
dual aspect — order and disorder — corresponds, in the language of anthropology, to 
two ways of looking at any civilisation: there is, on the one hand, culture, and on the 
other, society. By culture, we mean the relationships that the members of a given 
civilisation have with the external world, and by society, we mean more especially the 
relations men have with each other. Culture produces organisation: ploughing the 
land, building houses, manufacturing objects, etc. ... society ... produces entropy, or 
disorder. “Government of men” corresponds to society and increasing entropy; 
“administration of things” corresponds to culture and the creation of an increasingly 
varied and complex order.26 
Lévi-Strauss “entropological” musings on the exhaustion of cultural difference, and his 
tentative speculations on social justice as an energetic balancing-act, can be approached both 
as a speculative synthesis of many of the aforementioned strands of nineteenth-century 
thought (thus providing a somewhat different genealogy to structuralist anti-humanism than 
we are accustomed to) and as an important contrast to what we could, by way of 
approximation, term a dialectical tradition in the thinking of exhaustion, which I would like 
to explore in what follows, beginning with Marx’s deployment of the language of exhaustion, 
through recent Marxist critiques of the dominant discourses of the Anthropocene, and 
concluding with the (tragic) place of material exhaustion in the account of historical praxis in 
the Critique of Dialectical Reason — the very target of Lévi-Strauss’s The Savage Mind. 
 
The Historical Nature of Exhaustion and the Exhaustion of Historical Natures 
The most complex social figure of exhaustion emerging from the multifarious debates of the 
nineteenth century — with their abrupt shifts in register, from the energetic to the racial, the 
biological to the climactic, and so on — was arguably the one drawn by Marx from the soil 
exhaustion debates. Unlike the negative philosophies of history that could be distilled from 
ideologies of degeneration and entropy, Marx’s metabolic thinking sought to reckon with the 
deeply destructive impact of bourgeois society’s exploitation of human, animal and material 
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natures while having no truck with speculative philosophies of histories anchored in various 
strains of civilizational pessimism, with all their dubious variations on the theme of the 
decline of the West. As proponents of the “metabolic rift” interpretation of ecological 
Marxism have argued, it was in his readings of the work of scientists like Justus von Leibig 
on soil chemistry or Carl Fraas on agrarian crises, readings filling copious notebooks during 
the composition of Capital, that Marx developed a conception of the immanent relations 
between capitalist accumulation and natural exhaustion. In this conceptualization of socio-
ecological exhaustion, Marx developed the insight of nature as an internal limit to (the 
reproduction of) capital and capital as an internal limit to (the reproduction of) nature.  
In the first volume of Capital, Marx would write of how the capitalist mode of 
production  
collects the population together in great centres, and causes the urban population to 
achieve an ever-greater preponderance. … [It] disturbs the metabolic interaction 
between man and the earth, i.e., it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent 
elements consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the 
operation of the eternal natural condition for the lasting fertility of the soil. Thus it 
destroys at the same time the physical health of the urban worker, and the intellectual 
life of the rural worker.27  
This insight was joined by related ones, namely that the time required for the reproduction of 
nature is generally too long for capital, and indeed is in contradiction with its turnover times; 
that capital accumulation requires an accelerating exhaustion of nature; and that, most 
significantly, such exhaustion can only be prevented by the social planning of this 
metabolism (Marx remarked upon the way in which contemporary accounts of environmental 
exhaustion, be it through deforestation, desiccation or soil exhaustion were haunted by an 
“unconscious socialist tendency”).28  
The analogy and dialectic between the exhaustion of natural “resources” and the 
exhaustion — beyond fatigue, beyond reproduction — of the bodies of laborers is a critical 
juncture in Das Kapital itself. As Marx writes:  
Capital asks no questions about the length of life of labour-power. What interests it is 
purely and simply the maximum of labour-power that can be set in motion in a 
working day. It attains this objective by shortening the life of labour-power, in the 
same way as a greedy farmer snatches more produce from the soil by robbing it of its 
fertility.29  
Toscano 9		
Labour may be conceived by Marx as a paradoxical “extinguishing fire,” the productive 
consumption of fixed capital and raw materials, but it also a self-extinguishing which is at 
work under the accelerative imperatives of capital — an extinguishing or degradation of the 
actual, physiological bearers of concrete living labors, which goes hand in hand with the 
extinguishing or degradation of nature.30 In this parallel, between the worker and the soil (or 
nature), as the sole ultimate sources of social wealth, Marx alerts us to the possibility, 
immanent to the imperatives of capital, of an expanding crisis of reproduction, in which the 
living sources of value come to be exhausted — a process which, as the entire chapter on the 
working day demonstrates, with its meticulous attention to the degradation of laboring 
bodies, diets, reproductive systems, etc. is profoundly affected by class struggles, which are 
always (and I am tempted to argue above all) struggles over reproduction.  
While the theme and notion of exhaustion pervades the writing of Marx and Engels, 
circulating between the enervation of proletarian bodies, the depletion of natural processes 
and the degradations of bourgeois civilization, and resonating with a vast array of 
contemporaneous literatures of exhaustion, it is not as such the object of sustained, direct 
theoretical treatment.  
By way of rectification, I want to turn here to Jason W. Moore’s Capitalism in the 
Web of Life, which includes an illuminating discussion of the distinction between relative and 
absolute exhaustion.31 Some basic coordinates to Moore’s complex and ambitious theoretical 
work are in order. Capitalism in the Web of Life is a critical intervention into the ecological 
Marxist debate, combining the historical methodology of world-systems theory and an 
ontological claim about the “double internality” of nature and capitalism in an insistent 
polemic against any dualism of nature and society (of which he also accuses “metabolic rift” 
ecological Marxism). It is not surprising then, in arguing against what he sees as the 
Cartesian prejudice of a Green Thought that would treat nature as an independent limit to 
social manipulation, that he himself would turn to the question of exhaustion. For Moore, 
capitalist accumulation, ever since its 15th century inception, has relied on a combination of 
exploitation (of paid labour in the immediate process of production) and appropriation (the 
dispossession and “free” use of unpaid work/energy, what Maria Mies had called, in 
Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale, the capitalist basis, and invisible iceberg, of 
“women, nature and colonies”). 32 Capitalism’s increases in productivity and its constant 
struggles against the falling rate of profit have depended on successive assaults on 
commodity frontiers (from the silver mines of Potosí to the forests of Norway, from the coal 
fields of nineteenth-century England to contemporary oceans and aquifers). According to 
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Moore, “capitalism must commodify life/work but depends upon the ‘free ride’ of 
uncommodified life/work to do so. Hence the centrality of the frontier.”33 Building on Rosa 
Luxemburg and David Harvey’s theories of imperialism, while supplementing them with an 
account of capitalism as the co-production of “historical natures,” Moore argues that without 
these “free gifts,” which is to say these violent thefts, the production of surplus value would 
have never gotten off the ground. This is why “the problem of exhaustion”, according to 
Moore, “is a problem of how capital puts nature to work.”34  
The violent abstraction and appropriation, which is also to say the co-production of 
“Nature,” is thus key to capitalism as a “world-ecology” in its own right. This is what Moore 
terms  
capital’s correspondence project, through which capital seeks to remake reality in its 
own image, and according to its own rhythms. Agricultural landscapes become 
exhausted because capital must extract unpaid work faster than agro-ecological 
relations can reproduce themselves. Working classes become exhausted because 
capital must extract surplus labour as fast as possible. Particular capitalists might gain 
in the process, but over time, capital as a whole suffers, because the system-wide 
capitalization of reproduction costs proceeds apace. The share of unpaid work 
declines. The ecological surplus falls.35 
Capital is what Moore calls a praxis of external nature, combining “productivity and 
plunder.”36 Surplus-value generated from the exploitation of abstract labour within the circuit 
of capital thus depends on the appropriation of unpaid/work energy in a value-relation with 
what is (relatively) outside that circuit. With time, however, each arrangement of this 
exploitation/appropriation dialectic is undone, as capital is forced to internalize (“capitalise,” 
in Moore’s vocabulary) the appropriated natures — say, to plant “sustainable” forests rather 
than to deforest at will. For the sake of historical and systemic understanding (as well as of 
political praxis) what is critical here is not primarily the finitude of resources that may be 
“wiped out,” but the collapse of a particular relation of exploitation and appropriation, which 
can be, to use Moore’s terminology, “maxed out.” As he writes: 
It is not an absolute exhaustion of an abstract and historical nature that “causes” … 
crises of profitability. Rather, it is the exhaustion of specific complexes of socio-
ecological relations that induce transitions from one systemic cycle to the next. Put 
simply, there is simultaneous exhaustion of the organizational structures and of the 
historical nature specific to the old accumulation regime.37  
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A “maxed out” historical nature “no longer delivers a rising stream of work/energy into — or 
in support of — the circuit of capital”.38 Relational, rather than absolute exhaustion, then, is 
not just relative to particular structures and conjunctures of work-energy, it is an exhaustion 
of relations.39 The basic (value-)relation that comes to be exhausted is the one that leads to a 
falling rate of profit through the increase in the ration of constant to variable capital (what 
Marx terms the organic composition of capital) within the valorization process. Successive 
capitalist strategies to produce, appropriate (and exhaust) “Cheap Nature,” also understood as 
the “ecological surplus” — composed of what Moore calls the “Four Cheaps” (food, energy, 
raw materials, human living labour) — are all aimed at depressing the cost of circulating 
capital. But the returns are inevitably diminishing. As Moore notes: “These broadly entropic 
transitions highlight the self-consuming character of the capital relation, which tends to burn 
through its necessary biophysical conditions (included workers) and in so doing to jack up 
the organic composition of capital.”40 The double process of exploitation and appropriation 
must take place simultaneously “because life-activity within the circuit of capital is subject to 
relentless exhaustion” — as re-reading Marx’s chapter on the working day, or attending to 
the ethnography of factories on neoliberalism’s contemporary frontiers readily attests.41 
We are returned here, on a grand systemic and environmental scale, the scale of 
world-ecology, to the initial domain of the fatigue/exhaustion distinction in the nineteenth 
century, that of human labour (paid and unpaid, visible and invisible) and its conditions: “The 
dialectic of capitalization and appropriation turns, fundamentally, on the relations through 
which humans are re/produced.”42 Now, though Moore argues that limits are co-produced by 
nature and capital, or rather by capitalism in the web of life, he is also arguing in the final 
analysis that relative exhaustion (of Cheap Nature) is palpably turning into a kind of absolute 
exhaustion — not just in the sense of the total exhaustion of certain natures, but as the 
exhaustion of the crucial strategy of accumulation itself, the dialectic of exploitation and 
appropriation, with the latter always needing to be “larger” and “faster” than the former to 
pre-empt crises of profitability. “Relative to capital as a whole, the opportunities for 
appropriation have never been fewer, while the demand for such appropriations has never 
been greater.”43 The historical-material relation of exhaustion, the relative turning into the 
absolute (or as absolute as we could hope, or fear), in the “end of cheap nature,” resurrects 
after its own fashion the “pessoptimistic” philosophy of history we encountered at the 
beginning with Kant and Engels, exhaustion and antagonism as a prelude to a revolution that 
can only be planetary.  
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The Baleful Dialectic of Exhaustion and Acceleration 
To the extent that “[e]very act of exploitation implies an even greater act of appropriation,” 
the capitalist world-ecology is defined at its core by a (negative) dialectic of exhaustion and 
acceleration.44 Marx had already glimpsed this dynamic, a speculative (and financialized) 
logic, in his Theories of Surplus Value, again putting matters in terms of the twin degradation 
of human bodies and natural systems: 
Anticipation of the future — real anticipation — occurs in the production of wealth in 
relation to the worker and to the land. The future can indeed be anticipated and ruined 
in both cases by premature overexertion and exhaustion, and by the disturbance of the 
balance between expenditure and income. In capitalist production this happens to both 
the worker and the land … What is shortened here exists as power and the life span of 
this power is shortened as a result of accelerated expenditure.45 
That acceleration is an intrinsic trait of the social form of capitalism is a lesson easily 
garnered from much of Marx’s work, but what is its specifically ecological dimension? In his 
Time, Labor and Social Domination, Moishe Postone has tried to specify it by remarking 
upon capital’s tendency “to generate a constant acceleration in the growth of productivity.” 
But these increases in productivity only increase surplus value indirectly. Thus, “the ever-
increasing levels of productivity generated by capital accumulation entail directly 
corresponding increases in the masses of products produced and of raw materials consumed 
in production” but these do not necessarily give rise to increases in surplus value — as we 
can see today when (a point also stressed by Moore), the accelerating consumption of natural 
resources gives diminishing returns in profit terms (requiring precarious supplementation by 
financial instruments). Following Marx’s remarks on the metabolic rift that capital wreaks on 
soil fertility, a paradigm of capitalist exhaustion as such, Postone remarks upon the 
“accelerating destruction of the natural environment” as an intrinsic feature of capitalist 
accumulation. Rightly, Postone indicates Marx’s transcendence of critiques of capitalism 
from a productivist stance (where it is a fetter to productive forces requiring liberation) or 
ones that center on the domination of nature: 
The relation of humans and nature mediated by labor becomes a one-way process of 
consumption, rather than a cyclical interaction. It acquires the form of an accelerating 
transformation of qualitatively particular raw materials into “matter,” into 
qualitatively homogeneous bearers of objectified time. The problem with capital 
accumulation, then, is not only that it is unbalanced and crisis-ridden, but also that its 
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underlying form of growth is marked by runaway productivity that neither is 
controlled by the producers nor functions directly to their benefit.46 
 In his landmark book Fossil Capital, Andreas Malm has further specified this 
accelerating exhaustion of nature, exploring the consequences of capital’s structural 
indifference to natural boundaries (as opposed to intra-capitalist limits), its qualitative neglect 
and quantitative over-taxing of nature – a process that takes the form of a spiral, in which the 
“more biophysical resources [the capitalist] has withdrawn for profit-making, the more he is 
able to withdraw in the following round.”47 Referencing the work of his collaborator, the 
ecologist Alf Hornborg, Malm details how profit-driven accumulation determines the 
capacity to draw on increasingly greater quanta of energy and materials, showing how 
monetary accumulation determines an acceleration in the claims upon and dissipation of 
“other people’s resources.” The social relations within which capital accumulation and 
resource use are embedded, and in which human, animal and material natures exist only 
relative to the measures and expediencies of accumulation, mean that dissipation is not 
castigated or checked, but positively rewarded. The more the capitalist successfully exploits 
and wastes, the more he will be able to continue to do so — capitalist growth has ecological 
crisis wired into its DNA.48 This image of the spiral of accumulation and dissipation 
resonates with the one drawn by John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark from William Stanley 
Jevons’s The Coal Question, a key text in the nineteenth-century preoccupation with 
exhaustion. According to the “Jevons paradox,” far from diminishing resource usage, a more 
efficient and “economic” employment of matter and energy (in this instance, coal) serves to 
increase it. As Jevons noted: “If the quantity of coal used in a blast-furnace, for instance, be 
diminished in comparison with the yield, the profits of the trade will increase, new capital 
will be attracted, the price of pig-iron will fall, but the demand for it increase; and eventually 
the greater number of furnaces will more than make up for the diminished consumption of 
each.”49 (As Bellamy Foster and Clark observe, by contrast with Marx and Engels the great 
marginalist economist did not turn this observation into a critique of capitalist model of 
growth and resource-use, but rather into its tragic-heroic assumption; having posed the 
alternative [for the British Empire] as one of between the doomed pursuit of glory in the 
present and “longer continued mediocrity,” Jevons opted for the former.50) 
Notwithstanding their decisive methodological and theoretical disagreements, both 
Malm and Moore have raised the problem of the ideologies of species agency that govern the 
recent infatuation with the discourse of the Anthropocene, which both have rechristened the 
Capitalocene.51 The problem of exhaustion is for both an occasion to revisit the question of 
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agency — Moore opting for a broadly “monist” take on the “co-production” of historical 
natures by capitalism through the “web of life,” Malm a “dualist” vision in which the impact 
of capital on nature is to be understood through the internal class antagonism sundering any 
putative “humanity” (as he pointedly writes “no other species can have its metabolism 
organized through such sharp internal divisions”52). By way of a philosophical coda, whose 
aim is to open a way of thinking exhaustion — the limits to capital and the limits of nature — 
in a manner diagonal to this dualist-monist divide, hopefully applying further dialectical 
torque to a debate already rich with insights about the contradictions and negativity attendant 
to the nature in and of social relations, I want to touch on Jean-Paul Sartre’s idea of “matter 
as inverted praxis,” as advanced in the first volume of his Critique of Dialectical Reason.  
 
Deforestation and Tragic Form 
Relying on René Grousset’s 1942 Histoire de la Chine, Sartre depicts the scene of peasant 
deforestation as a paradigmatic instance of how “serial” human action is unified, as a 
“counter-finality,” by matter, giving rise to a situation in which man becomes his own Other, 
his own enemy. It is in terms of this figure of oneself as an enemy, so critical to Hegel’s 
account of the tragic, that I propose to interpret Sartre’s Critique as, among other things, a 
tragedy of materiality. This is the very counter-finality of which Engels had spoken in The 
Dialectics of Nature, intimating the possibility of a “revenge of nature” against our 
daydreams of mastery: “Every victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we 
expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which 
only too often cancel the first”53. Sartre begins from the position of what Moore would term 
“Cartesian dualism,” though as the Critique advances, he twists it beyond all recognition.  
 Praxis, he writes, is “primarily an instrumentalization of material reality” giving the 
things it envelops a “pseudo-organic unity”, one borrowed from the unity of the individual as 
a practical organism.54 But matter’s unity (and in a sense its agency) endures through inertia. 
In working upon matter, individually and serially, directly and indirectly, humankind 
produces a practico-inert reality, the world as a kind of “petrified backlash” of our own 
activity. Reified material objects reflect our praxis, but in its passivity. In an acerbic variation 
on the idea of the alienation of human capacities in the product of labour, Sartre writes of 
how “practice absorbed by its “material” becomes a material caricature of the human.”55 In 
materializing itself, mediating itself through the inertias of matters, human action “enters into 
relation with the entire Universe,” such that “infinitely many unforeseeable relations are 
established, through the mediation of social practice, between the matter which absorbs 
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praxis and other materialised significations.”56 What the example of the praxis of peasant 
deforestation and the subsequent “tragedy” of flooding instantiate a broader truth about the 
ontology of human action, namely that the “[i]nert praxis which imbibes matter transforms 
natural, meaningless forces into quasi-human practices, that is to say, into passivized 
actions.”57 I’d like to propose that such a concept, of “passivized action,” can go some way to 
cutting across or rearticulating the antinomies of agency in the Anthropocene (or 
Capitalocene), including as it does within it a kind of phenomenology of the genesis of our 
ideologies of action.  
In Sartre’s example, the Chinese peasants’ historic conquest of the soil could not 
foresee the lack that would turn against them, the absence of trees. Deforestation, as a 
passivized practice whose explicit finality was not the removal of trees but the plenitude of 
harvests, took place in the wilds, in the “frontiers” (to return to that theme from Moore) that 
at the time represented the “historical limits of society”. The removal of obstacles was 
transmuted or inverted into the lack of protection, turning the human activity of deforestation 
into the production of a virtually unified enemy of the peasant, an enemy who, embodied in 
nature as his inverted praxis, is ultimately “himself.” Sartre’s summation could, with some 
tweaking (mainly in terms of the potential for foresight) be adapted to the so-called 
Anthropocene:  
Thus, the whole history of the terrible Chinese floods appears as an intentionally 
constructed mechanism. If some enemy of mankind had wanted to persecute the 
peasants of the Great Plain, he would have ordered mercenary troops to deforest the 
mountains systematically. The positive system of agriculture was transformed into an 
infernal machine. But the enemy who introduced the loess, the river, the gravity, the 
whole of hydrodynamics, into this destructive apparatus was the peasant himself. Yet, 
taken in the moment of its living development, his action does not include this 
rebound, either intentionally or in reality.58 
All counter-finality, of which the flooding haunting traditional Chinese agriculture is but an 
example, is adumbrated for Sartre by “a kind of disposition of matter.” In counter-finality, 
human action becomes a strange, reified destiny, serially produced, and collectively 
experienced. In counter-finality, 
human praxis has to become a fatality and to be absorbed by inertia, taking on both 
the strictness of physical causation and the obstinate precision of human labour. 
Destruction by Nature is imprecise: it leaves little islands, even whole archipelagos. 
Human destruction is systematic: a particular farmer proceeds on the basis of an 
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approach to a limit which conditions his praxis — quite simply, the idea that every 
tree growing in his field should be destroyed.59  
Thus humanity is unified in its own alienated antagonism against itself: “deforestation as the 
action of Others becomes everyone's action as Other in matter. … Others are fused, as 
Others, in the passive synthesis of a false unity; and, conversely, the Oneness stamped on 
matter reveals itself as Other than Oneness. The peasant becomes his own material fatality; 
he produces the floods which destroy him.”60 Counter-finality creates a unity-in-potential-
catastrophe which the previous uncoordinated actions of groups could never manifest, though 
it also launches fierce and unprecedented antagonisms. As Sartre remarks, Chinese 
deforestation “creates universal solidarity in the face of a single danger. But at the same time 
it aggravates antagonisms, because it represents a social future both for the peasants and for 
the land-owners. This future is both absurd, in that it comes to man from the non-human, and 
rational, in that it merely accentuates the essential features of the society.”61 
In exhaustion and catastrophe, the historical limits of human action become the very 
sources of political, or even species, unity, a unity of necessity beset by antagonisms — 
which Sartre encapsulates in the notion of anti-physis:  
This … relation of man to the non-human — where Nature becomes the negation of 
man precisely to the extent that man is made anti-physis and that the actions in 
exteriority of the atomised masses are united by the communal character of their 
results — does not as yet integrate materiality with the social, but makes mere Nature, 
as a brutal, exterior limitation of society, into the unity of men. What has happened is 
that, through the mediation of matter, men have realised and perfected a joint 
undertaking because of their radical separation. Nature, as an exterior constraint on 
society, at least in this particular form, constrains society as an interiority based on the 
objectification in exteriority of that society. … Nature, though transcended, reappears 
within society, as the totalising relation of all materiality to itself and of all workers to 
one another.62 
This relation of inverted praxis goes beyond the holism of “double internality” posited by 
Moore, to reveal a process in which “we” become our own enemy in the shape of a nature 
that bears the imprint of our praxis (in ways specific to its material disposition). Nature’s 
externality, albeit painfully real (in the form here of recurrent flooding) is also an inner 
relation of society. Nature, seemingly transcended through mankind’s work on matter, 
“transforms human praxis into antipraxis, that is to say, into a praxis without an author, 
transcending the given towards rigid ends, whose hidden meaning is counter-finality.”63 
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Nature is a historical limit of society, and of capital, only to the extent that society has 
externalized itself in it. It is in this, dialectical, sense, that we can begin thinking the relation 
between the limits of capital and the limits of nature in a manner neither endogenous nor 
exogenous, dualist nor holistic; in other words, that we can begin to think the Anthropocene, 
or rather the Capitalocene, as a geological and historical figure of alienated agency “where 
Nature,” as Sartre writes, “becomes the negation of man precisely to the extent that man is 
made anti-physis,” anti-nature. 
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